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ARTICLES





When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,' commentators ex-
pected the Court to resolve the split among the federal circuits re-
garding the validity and enforceability of 'opt-in' agreements.2
Since the late 1990s, these agreements had become a means
through which contracting parties could obtain enhanced judicial
supervision of arbitral awards by providing for judicial review of
the merits of arbitrator rulings.' While commentators got a resolu-
tion to the split, they received a great deal more than they had
been promised.' In effect, the Court concluded that the statutory
framework for enforcement applied as a matter of law and, there-
fore, was solely controlling in all circumstances of enforcement.-
* Orlando Distinguished Professor of Law, Penn State University. LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia
University; J.D. M.A., University of Virginia; B.A., M.A., Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar);
A.B., Bowdoin College. I published an initial evaluation of Hall Street Associates soon after it
was rendered: Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.: A New Englander's Tale of Statu-
tory Supremacy in Arbitration Law, 2008 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB. REV. 19. The present text
represents a substantial reworking of the initial evaluation in light of subsequent developments
in the case law. I wish to express my gratitude to Anthony Rallo, Class of 2014, Penn State Law,
for his assistance with the research and footnotes for this article.
1 Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d
254 (2008).
2 See, e.g., Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1172 (2002); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001); Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003); Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343
F. 3d 57 (2d Cir. 2003); Schoch v. Info USA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1180 (2004); Puerto Rico Tel. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
See generally Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop? 61(4) Dise. RESOL. J. 16 (2006).
3 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 302 (4th ed.
2012).
4 See text at notes 135-47 infra, then up to conclusion section (no footnote numbers availa-
ble apart from those referred to).
5 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 579, 586, 589-90.
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The framework was not merely a regulatory alternative to provide
rules for enforcement when the contract was silent.' The statutory
framework provided the governing law and could not be modified
by contract.
In Hall Street Associates, six justices determined that Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) §§ 9-11 were "exclusive."' According to
the majority opinion, the governing statute provided "expedited ju-
dicial review to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards"9 and
could not be "supplemented by contract."10 The Court's determi-
nation appeared to favor arbitration in its prioritization of the alac-
rity of judicial supervision. The Court effectively thwarted contract
freedom when its exercise transformed arbitration into protracted
adjudication that involved intrusive judicial scrutiny. The full im-
pact of the Hall Street Associates holding upon the U.S. law of arbi-
tration, however, would become clearer in light of the later rulings
in Rent-A-Center" and Stolt-Nielsen.12 The restraints placed upon
contract freedom by the Hall Street Court could be more properly
assessed once the brief for greater judicial supervision in arbitra-
tion had been expressly articulated." In fact, the Court's descrip-
tion and explanation of its ruling in Hall Street Associates belied
the true import of the holding. The goal was not to foster expedi-
tious enforcement actions, but to clarify which actor had the au-
thority to make the rules and impose them.
Ironically, the concern for remedial efficiency had the conse-
quence of entrenching the courts in the final phase of the arbitral
process. Public jurisdictional authority dictated enforcement pro-
cedures and would be exercised whenever voluntary compliance
proved elusive." Neither the parties nor the arbitrators were ex-
empt from the fundamental juridical requirements for adjudica-
tion. Only the courts could perform an oracular function; they
were the guardians of the governing standards. Parties had the
6 For a statement of the fallback position, see Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257
F.3d 287 (3d Cir) cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001).
7 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 579, 586, 589-90.
8 Id. at 579, 586, 590.
9 Id. at 578.
10 Id.
11 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 177 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2010).
12 Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L. Ed. 2d 605 (2010).
13 See text infra note 147 and accompanying text.
14 The only way to avoid the reach of the law at this stage of the process was to accept the
arbitrator's ruling as rendered and eliminate any possibility of controversy. Of course, the losing
party with sufficient means or nothing to lose was unlikely to ignore law that could favor its
interest.
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right to agree to arbitrate disputes in a customized manner, but
neither they nor their private judges could escape the gravitational
force of the law. All forms of adjudication eventually had to re-
volve around, and conform to, core legal values. In the end, de-
spite its initial and intermediary autonomy, private justice was held
accountable to public law imperatives. The day of unchecked arbi-
tral authority, completely unrestricted in its exercise, seemed to be
at an end. In the final analysis, extensive judicial supervision
would generate more litigation about arbitration" and afford
courts an opportunity to assume a contrarian position on arbitral
autonomy.16
Stylistic opacity made the opinion in Hall Street somewhat in-
accessible. In fact, as rendered, the opinion may be more signifi-
cant for what it omits than for what it actually says." The
indirection of the holding could be explained by the difficulty of
reaching a consensus among the justices. As Justice Ginsburg has
made clear in televised remarks,18 majority opinions are a patch-
work of compromise. Coherence and clarity are often sacrificed to
reach a suitable common denominator. Adjustments are made to
the language of the opinion; these adjustments generate consensus
but affect the conceptual quality of the reasoning. The members of
Court majorities are no less gifted than the justices who express
dissenting views. Each justice in the majority must be convinced to
vote for a single, unified opinion. Dissenting opinions are not com-
pelled by the need for accommodation. They advocate for a single
position, resulting in a more linear and well-crafted text (e.g., Jus-
tice Souter as the author of the majority decision in Hall Street As-
sociates and as a dissenter in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S.
247, 274 [2009]). The majority opinion in Hall Street Associates is
fully within the ambit of this practice.
Furthermore, although the Court is preoccupied with arbitra-
tion,19 the justices are not students of arbitration law.2 0 While they
15 "[flull-bore legal and evidentiary appeals" will erode arbitration's efficiency and finality.
See Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 588.
16 The Ninth Circuit has most often assumed a contrarian position on arbitration. See
THOMAs E. CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 209, 226.
17 See id. at 318.
18 Interview by Brian Lamb, CSPAN, with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Supreme
Court, Justice's Chambers, Washington, D.C. (July 1, 2009), transcript available at: http://
supremecourt.c-span.org/assets/pdf/RBGinsburg.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
19 For a list of cases on arbitration decided by the Court, see THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU,
supra note 3, at 281 n.2.
20 The policy objective in the doctrine is clear and steadfast, but many of the distinctions are
facile and somewhat unpersuasive. Some opinions lack comprehensiveness as well as analytical
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have created a body of doctrine, their interest in arbitration is
neither principled nor analytical. The Court has rarely, if ever, ex-
pressed a serious interest in the intellectual content of arbitration
law;2 1 instead, the Court plays the role of craftsman, fixated on
elaborating workable rules that promote recourse to arbitration. It
wants doctrine to maintain the objectives of the policy on arbitra-
tion, which, in turn, guarantees that U.S. citizens have access to an
efficient and effective form of adjudication. 22 The justices envisage
arbitration as an instrument of practical policy, and they alter, re-
pair, and modify the doctrine to maintain the efficacy of its applica-
tion. Arbitration is not a basis upon which to conduct lofty
juridical debates.
The opinion has other interesting, albeit less problematic, as-
pects. It is the first majority opinion on arbitration authored by
Justice Souter.2 3 Moreover, Justices Scalia and Thomas assume an
uncharacteristic role.2 4 In prior rulings, they both expressed strong
objections to the extension of the federal arbitration policy and
doctrine to state courts and legislatures.25  Notwithstanding the ma-
jority's references to the hegemony of the federal arbitral law,
neither of them dissents and both join in the majority. In addition,
verve. There have been conversions to arbitration among members of the Court, most notably,
Justice Stevens and Scalia. A number of opinions display analytical rigor and sophistication-
for example, Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 173 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2009) (the
exchange between Justice Ginsberg for the majority and Chief Justice Roberts in dissent). Too
many of them, however, have a limited scope and generate baffling concepts unknown in other
regulatory frameworks on arbitration (e.g., the would-be second separability doctrine in Rent-A-
Center). Separability is a traditional concept in the law of arbitration. It was instituted to pro-
tect arbitration agreements from dilatory attacks by parties who attempted to establish the
'piggy-back' invalidity of the arbitral clause by alleging that the main contract was null and void.
The Court recognized separability in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 87 S. Ct. 1801, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270 (1967), and reaffirmed its application in Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1038 (2006). Justice
Scalia's 'discovery' of a second separability doctrine in Rent-A-Center applying to threshold ju-
risdictional matters is a peculiar application of the concept. Its effect is to invite judicial intru-
sion at the beginning of the proceedings. Nonetheless, there are substantially creative moments
in the decisional law on arbitration. The movement from, and interplay between, Kaplan, How-
sam, Bazzle, and-finally-Stolt-Nielsen first reflect ingenious analysis and then engender a
nearly overwhelming push in the opposite direction. Nonetheless, I still believe that arbitration
is, first and foremost, an instrument of practical policy for the Court, with the integrity of doc-
trine standing as a distant secondary factor. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at xiii-
xxxii, 36-43.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CARBONNEAU ON ARBITRATION: COLLECTED Es-
SAYs 403 (2010).
23 See id. at 495.
24 See id. at n. 11.
25 Id.
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Justices Breyer and Ginsburg have written a number of significant
majority opinions on arbitration.2 6  Even though they share a lib-
eral political ideology, they deviate on the result in Hall Street As-
sociates and appear on different sides of the Court. Their
disagreement confirms that the Court's arbitration doctrine is not
embedded in shared ideological convictions. It is firmly grounded
in policy and legal analysis, with the former dwarfing the latter in
most cases.
Also, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, becomes the
proponent-in-chief of the contract freedom idea, a consideration
almost completely ignored by the majority opinion.2 7 Justice Ste-
vens becomes the leading spokesman for arbitral self-governance
and autonomy-a far cry from his dissent in Mitsubishi v. Soler.28
In fact, Justice Stevens' dissent is the most intellectually engaging
part of the opinion. Furthermore, Justice Scalia adheres to the ma-
jority opinion but objects without explanation to the content of
footnote seven, in which the majority draws a parallel between the
FAA at the time of its enactment and New York State arbitration
law.29
Finally, it should be emphasized that the greater judicial ag-
gression that Hall Street Associates seems to harbor against arbitra-
tion could herald the dismantling of the edifice of law surrounding
arbitration. Judicial acquiescence and even favorable judicial ad-
vocacy are necessary to maintain the ascendency and establishment
of arbitration.o Prior to the line of cases beginning with Hall Street
26 Id. at n. 13.
27 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 592.
28 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640, 105 S.Ct.
3346, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1985).
29 Justice Scalia joined the majority but refused to embrace footnote seven of the majority
opinion. The note discusses the interface between the FAA and state laws on arbitration, espe-
cially the New York law that allegedly served as the model for the federal statute. The commen-
tary and sources indicate a clear link between the federal statute and state law. Justice Scalia
provides no explanation for his objection. It must relate to his formerly staunch opposition to
the imposition of the federal legislation on state courts. He has dissented on this basis in previ-
ous cases, but declared in Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson that he would no longer voice his
objections until a majority on the Court supported them. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 297 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitra-
tion, in BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION 333, 356-57 (T. Carbonneau & A. Sino-
pole, eds.) (Wildly, Simmonds & Hill Publishing 2010). ("The shaping and systemic stature of
arbitration depend upon the judicial response to the process ... The endorsement of arbitration
... implies recognition of the limitations of the methodology of judicial litigation, that the pur-
suit of the national interest or justice can require a commitment to the non-sectarian and enlight-
ened policy, and the alterations in human civilization demand an adjustment by local systems .. .
597
598 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 14:593
Associates3 ' and continuing to Rent-A-Center32 and Stolt-Nielsen ,3
the true danger to arbitration law in America had come in the form
of proposed congressional legislation to ban the use of arbitration
in a civil rights context and adhesive circumstances. 3 4 Several de-
cades ago, the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act35 began a
limited congressional campaign against arbitration; the Arbitration
Fairness Act3 6 is the most recent expression of congressional oppo-
sition. These efforts have been unavailing and never reached the
floor of the U.S. Congress. A 'scorched-earth' policy against arbi-
tration in select areas could cause significant damage to the institu-
It is one thing to have courts correct salient, exceptional abuses of the process; it is quite another
matter to distrust the decisional capabilities of the arbitrators by continuing to incorporate safe-
guards against arbitral decisions in the statutory law. The retention of a would-be judicial safety
valve is not a practice that will advance the interests of arbitration, society, or global commerce.
Admitting to the failures of judicial litigation and recognizing the need to transcend parochial
views of legality constitute a better practice and policy. If arbitration is to remain successful, the
shadow of vestigial doubts must be extinguished through the light of unconditional acceptance.
Law is but a lifeless platitude when it cannot be applied effectively to the resolution of
disputes.").
31 See note 1 supra.
32 See note 8 supra.
33 See note 9 supra.
34 See THOMAs E. CARBONNEAU, supra note 22, at 403.
35 See THOMAs E. CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 396. Introduction of the legislation was an
annual event. The latest measure was introduced on January 24, 2001 and referred to committee
and died there. See www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/5163. ("The proposed legislation was
intended primarily, it seems, to thwart arbitration's infringement upon the public law jurisdiction
of courts and its perceived unfairness to traditional political constituencies . . . Such bills have
been introduced annually in the U.S. Congress for more than two decades. They generally con-
stituted a symbolic protest against the growing impact of arbitration. The bills never came out of
committee. They generally banned the use of arbitration in disputes involving statutory rights.
They exemplified a singular and exclusive commitment to a most imperfect judicial process and
an unrealistic view of public judicial and legislative jurisdiction as sacrosanct.")
36 Id. at 396-97. "The stated purpose of the [Arbitration Fairness Act of 20071 is to disman-
tle the process of coerced arbitration in disparate-party transactional circumstances: '[N]o
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of: (1) an
employment, consumer, or franchise dispute, or (2) a dispute arising under any statute intended
to protect civil rights or to regulate contracts or transactions between parties of unequal bargain-
ing power.' It also eliminates, apparently in all arbitration circumstances, the jurisdictional or
Kompetenz-Kompetenz powers of the arbitrator: '[T]he validity or enforceability of an agree-
ment to arbitrate shall be determined by a court, under federal law, rather than an arbitrator,
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement spe-
cifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such agreement.' . . . In
effect, if the bill is enacted into law, the U.S. Congress will discriminate against arbitration as a
form of contract by placing disabling requirements upon it in certain transactions. By so doing,
the Congress will be engaging in conduct that the U.S. Supreme Court forbade to the states for
years through the federal preemption doctrine." See S. 1782 and H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. 1st
Sess. (July 12, 2007).
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tion of arbitration. The debt crisis at both the state and federal
levels may immunize arbitration from effective legislative attacks.
Government budgets are not only depleted, but they also are crip-
pled by deficits. Funding for new courts is simply not a priority in
these circumstances.3 8 The arbitral solution resolves the predica-
ment at little or no cost.3 9 Practicality thus far has triumphed, but
there are serious reasons why both the right and the left would
want to oppose the process. For the right, arbitration usurps the
legitimate authority of the courts and law; for the left, arbitration
exacerbates existing inequalities and reinforces corporate
positions.
II. THE AGREEMENT To ARBITRATE IN HALL
STREET ASSOCIATES
The litigating parties agreed to arbitration during a court pro-
ceeding after they were unable to mediate Hall Street Associates'
claim for indemnification of environmental clean-up costs. 4 0 The
parties entered into a submission agreement with the approval of
the district court. The agreement provided that the arbitrator must
rule pursuant to a standard of judicial correctness concerning evi-
dentiary matters and the application of law. Although judicial liti-
gation and structured negotiations were unsuccessful, the parties
did not want to stray too far from the judicial mold in reaching a
solution.4 1 Therefore, they judicialized the arbitral proceeding.
Moreover, they gave the court substantial authority to supervise
the arbitral procedure and determination:
The court shall vacate, modify or correct any award (i) where
the arbitrator's findings of facts (sic) are not supported by sub-
37 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, supra note 22, at 403.
38 See David A. Larson, The End ofArbitration As We Know It? Arbitration Under Attack, 3
Ya. ARB. & MED. 93, 96 (2011). The Minnesota court system currently costs more than $300
million per budget term to finance, and a recent biannual budget proposal included statewide
cuts of just under $1 billion; See also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Revelation And Reaction: The
Struggle To Shape American Arbitration, 3 Ye. ARB. & MED. 125 (2011).
39 See David A. Larson, supra note 38, at 96-7. "State budgets are in turmoil and legislators
must make significant cuts. Underfunded court systems that already were carefully rationing
resources will have to find additional ways to reduce expenditures, which probably will require
further reduction in services. As a result and as a simple, practical matter, the Judiciary needs
healthy arbitral institutions and smoothly functioning arbitral processes."
40 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 579.
41 Id. at 579-80.
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stantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of
law are erroneous.42
The intent underlying the parties' reference to arbitration was
unmistakable. The parties wanted the court to assume an activist
role and scrutinize the arbitrators' final disposition and the basis
for it. They trusted the arbitrators as long as the court monitored
them and maintained the ability to reject the foundation for or re-
verse their decision. For these parties, arbitration was only a 'boot-
strap' measure; the arbitrators' jurisdiction was not conclusive.
The parties, it appears, were wary of everyone, including them-
selves. Neither they nor the judge were able to decide; the arbitra-
tor could rule with finality only if the court thought the findings of
fact and conclusions of law were correct. The parties were obdu-
rate, the issues complex, and the potential liability enormous. The
parties wanted an arbitral outcome, but would accept it only if it
were justified at law-a paradigmatic contradiction in terms.4 3
III. THE HALL STREET COURT'S PERCEPTION OF ARBITRAL
DOCTRINE UNDER THE FAA
The Court begins the opinion with its customary recital of the
basic tenets of the U.S. law of arbitration. The declarations reflect
the Court's substantial reconfiguration of the FAA's content. For
example, referring to its decision in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.,4
the Court asserts that "Congress enacted the FAA to replace judi-
cial indisposition to arbitration with a 'national policy favoring [it]
and plac[ing] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other
contracts."' 4 5 By making the statement, the Court implicitly ac-
knowledges its 'make-over' of the FAA. Its rulings in the area
were never based on the enacting Congress' intent and objectives.
In 1925, the FAA was special interest legislation for the mercantile
community meant to fill a Swift v. Tyson gap in federal law by vali-
dating arbitration agreements in commercial transactions subject to
federal jurisdiction.4 6 The decisional law now expresses the Court's
42 Id. at 579.
43 Id. at 580-83.
44 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1038
(2006).
45 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. 581.
46 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17, 104 S.Ct. 852, 861, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1, 16 (1984)
(Justice O'Connor's dissent, sect. IV).
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assessment of the adjudicatory needs of American citizens. The
cases have become the repository of a national arbitration policy
resulting from the Court's increasingly result-oriented interpreta-
tion of statutory language.4 7
Furthermore, the Hall Street Court recognized the lack of fed-
eral question jurisdiction48 in the FAA, but maintained that the
omission had been remedied by the mandatory application of the
statute in both state and federal court.4 9 The statement is an ad-
mission that the Court adapted the federal preemption doctrine to
arbitration and integrated its effects into the governing law.s0 The
Court thereafter described the relevant provisions of the statute,
emphasizing §§9-11 that address the vacatur, confirmation, or cor-
rection of arbitral awards."' It underscored the presumptive judi-
cial duty to enforce awards unless the court discovers a statutorily
enumerated flaw in the award or the process. The Court also con-
tended that enforcement under the Act was "streamlined,"5 2 "ex-
pedited,"5 3 and a "shortcut to confirm, vacate, or modify an
award." 54 The Court's view of the procedure's rapidity arose in
part from the absence in FAA §10 of a basis for challenging an
award on the ground of non-existent or contractually defective
agreement to arbitrate.5 5 Most statutory frameworks regulating ar-
bitration provide a means for challenging awards on the basis of
flawed contract formation or the lack of party agreement. 6
Whether the lack of such a ground in FAA §10 implied speedy en-
forcement actions, however, is subject to debate.
47 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at xvi-xxii, 36-43, 124-47.
48 See, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 173 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2009).
49 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 26, 103 S.Ct.
927, 944, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765, 789 (1983).
50 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, ch. 5, p. 247 et seq.
51 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 586-87.
52 Id. at 582.
53 Id. at 584.
54 Id. at 583.
ss The contract validity of the agreement would be determined by reference to the applicable
state law of contract because there is no federal law on the subject. See generally Penn v. Ryan's
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001).
56 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, art. V, opened for signature, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3
(codified in 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-208 (1970)); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION, available at www.uncitral.org. On these instruments, see A. VAN DEN
BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981); H. HOLTZMAN & J. NEU-
HAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (1989).
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It is well-settled that the basis for court scrutiny under the
FAA5 1 was restricted to exceptional circumstances that involve fla-
grantly unprofessional arbitrator adjudicatory conduct. The
grounds describe significant procedural failings and thereby, albeit
implicitly, exclude a judicial reassessment of the substance of arbi-
tral determinations.58 By containing the scope of judicial scrutiny,
the FAA created a difficult-to-rebut presumption of enforceability.
The statute, therefore, narrowed the scope and limited the intensity
of judicial supervision. It did not necessarily require that the judi-
cial examination take place quickly-only that the action for con-
firmation or vacatur occur in a timely manner, within a year of
rendition of the award. 9 Accordingly, challenges to the existence
or validity of the arbitration agreement are brought at the head of
the process, rather than at the award-enforcement stage. The par-
ties' failure to exercise their rights within the designated time or at
the contemplated phase of the process extinguishes the right to
challenge.60 The FAA's explicit objective was to contain and ulti-
mately reduce judicial authority and the role of courts in the en-
forcement stage of the process.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON 'OPT-IN' AGREEMENTS
It is quite extraordinary that, given the issue for which certio-
rari was granted, the majority opinion never expressly referred to
'opt-in' agreements. Instead, it framed its holding in terms of the
exclusivity of the FAA grounds for confirmation and vacatur. As
Judge Cardozo demonstrated in his characterization of the plaintiff
in Adams v. Bullock6 ' as "a mischievous and thoughtless little
boy," 62 the way in which a legal issue is framed or characterized
often announces its resolution. In other words, the phrasing of a
legal question betokens the analysis that answers it. By ignoring
'opt-in' contracts that modify the statute, the Court focuses
mainly-indeed, nearly exclusively-on the statute itself. Moreo-
ver, the Court never explicitly addresses the contract freedom idea,
57 See generally THoMAs E. CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 491.
58 See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 250-61 (3d ed. 2012).
59 FAA§ 9. See Photopaint Tech., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (one-
year period is mandatory not permissive and, therefore, applies in all circumstances).
60 See CARBONNEAU. supra note 3, at 80-86.
61 Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1919), cited in MARC A. FRANKLIN, RoB-
ERT L. RABIN, & MICHAEL D. GREEN, eds., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 40 (8th ed. 2006).
62 Adams, 125 N.E. at 95.
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previously, a staple of the judicial doctrine on arbitration. Only the
dissenters, especially Justice Stevens, discuss the contracting par-
ties' right to set the terms of, and protocol for, all aspects of their
arbitration. The majority's unitary consideration of the statutory
language implies that contract freedom is not a factor in the arbi-
tral process' final stage. It applies primarily, perhaps only, to the
initial engagement in and first steps of the process. Once the tribu-
nal renders the award, the process eludes private contract and re-
enters the domain of law.
Furthermore, the majority's assessment of the circuit split on
'opt-in' agreements is approximative. The decisional history indi-
cates that the Fifth and, eventually, the Ninth Circuits established
the opposing doctrinal positions on the issue." In its opinions,64
the Fifth Circuit held that contracting parties were free to establish
the modalities of their arbitrations, including the ways in which
courts would assess resulting awards. The Third Circuit reinforced
this position when it ruled that the FAA amounted to a default
regime for regulating arbitration, consisting of mere "off-the-rack"
rules that applied when the contract was silent.6 5 After an en banc
reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit abandoned its initial position 6
and essentially endorsed the earlier reasoning of the Seventh Cir-
cuit, 67 holding that contracting parties could not act as a private
legislature and dictate court supervision of awards rendered pursu-
ant to their agreement to arbitrate. Private contract authority, it
was asserted, ended with the rendition of the award and the inabil-
ity to secure voluntary compliance. Over time, other federal cir-
cuits assumed a middle position,'6 8 holding that the FAA grounds
governed unless the parties 'clearly' and 'unmistakably' provided
for a private regime. The discussion of the topic in the Hall Street
majority opinion contained a number of significant lacunae: it did
not refer to the earlier Seventh Circuit opinion, 9 overstated the
conclusiveness of the Tenth Circuit decision in Bowen,70 failed to
63 See Gateway Tech., Inc., v. MCI, 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Ky-
ocera Corp., 130 F. 3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services,
Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
64 See, e.g., Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001).
65 See Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1020 (2001).
66 See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
67 See Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.3d 1501 (7th Cir.
1991).
68 See, e.g., Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2003).
69 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. 576.
70 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
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mention the Second Circuit pro-Kyocera holding in Hoeft v. MVL
Group, Inc" and placed insufficient importance upon many cir-
cuits' "grave skepticism"" concerning the existence of a contrac-
tual right to modify the FAA.
V. MANIFEST DISREGARD IN THE MAJORITY OPINION
Although Justice Souter justifiably criticizes Hall Street Asso-
ciates' strained arguments in favor of 'opt-in' provisions," his dis-
cussion of manifest disregard is perplexing. It is commonly
asserted that manifest disregard first arose in Wilko v. Swan7 4 and
functions as one of three common law grounds75 for the supervi-
sion of arbitral awards. Different federal circuits, however, have
made different assessments of the common law grounds. Some cir-
cuits recognize all three grounds, while others apply only one or
two of them.7 6 Most courts agree that manifest disregard applies
only in exceptional circumstances; it does not refer to mere error
by arbitrators on the law or questionable arbitrator interpretations
of the contract. The classical formulation is that it pertains to a
situation in which the arbitrators describe the applicable law co-
gently and knowledgeably and then deliberately ignore it in reach-
ing their determination.
Manifest disregard, like the other two common law grounds,
actually has little to do with Wilko. The opinion makes only an
incidental reference to the phrase, possibly by pure happenstance.
The concept is more likely to arise from the special circumstances
71 343 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2003).
72 See UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998).
73 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. 584-87.
74 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
7 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 377.
76 Id. at 378.
77 Id.
78 Id. In effect, manifest disregard is roughly equivalent to a finding that the arbitrator en-
gaged in amiable composition without the disputing parties' authorization. Amiable composi-
tion is a civil law concept that originated in French arbitration law, allowing arbitrators to rule in
equity when the application of the governing law would yield an unjust or inappropriate out-
come given the circumstances of the case. An arbitrator may rule as an amiable compositor only
if the parties specifically grant the arbitrator such authority. Granting the arbitrators the power
to rule as amiable compositors can act as a 'safety valve' for commercial parties seeking to avoid
legal conclusions that are antagonistic to their business interests. An arbitral award that recog-
nizes the governing law but deliberately ignores it can be vacated for manifest disregard of the
law.
2013] REVISITING HALL STREET ASSOCIATES
of the collective bargaining agreement.7 9  The common law
grounds are intended to prevent labor arbitrators from dispensing
a personal brand of industrial justice instead of the version agreed
to by labor and management.so It is difficult to reconcile manifest
disregard's antagonism toward the autonomy of arbitral determina-
tions with FAA §10's implied elimination of merits review.81
Nonetheless, Justice Souter's representations seem intended to
depreciate the significance of manifest disregard. Providing limited
authority for his assertions,8 2 Justice Souter declares that manifest
disregard-regardless of its true origins-may have been intended
as a "shorthand" description" for all the grounds expressly enu-
merated in FAA §10 or, yet again, only for those grounds specifi-
cally targeting arbitrator misconduct or excess of authority. Such
an intent, however, cannot be deduced either from the legislative
history or the statutory language. It has some support here and
there in a few court opinions. Furthermore, the majority opinion
strongly implies that manifest disregard is not a substantive-law ba-
sis for vacatur.
This assessment generated an avalanche of case law from
lower courts at both the federal and state levels." These courts
took various positions on the standing of manifest disregard. Some
concluded that it had been eradicated by Hall Street Associates;
others that it retained a role only in very limited circumstances;
and yet others that it remained active as. an independent substan-
tive basis for vacatur, although it summarized all of the statutory
grounds under FAA §10.86 Courts more skeptical of arbitration
wanted to retain leverage over arbitral awards, while those that
supported arbitration were willing to confine enforcement litiga-
tion to the enacted law.
7 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 509.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 360-61.
82 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 584-85.
83 Id. at 585.
84 Id. at 586.
85 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRAC-
TIcE 276-77 n. 8 (6th ed. 2012).
86 See id.
87 Improv West Associates v. Comedy Club, 129 S.Ct. 45 (2008); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Im-
prov West Associates, 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 145 (2009) (holding
that manifest disregard is a judicial gloss on FAA§(a)(4)).
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VI. THE IMMUTABLE JURISDICTION OF THE STATUTORY TEXT
The majority rejects Hall Street Associates' justifications for
'opt-in' agreements by using understated language. The Court
slaps away Hall Street Associates' contentions like annoying gnats.
The discussion is replete with litotes-for example, "no more than
arguable,"" "arguable is as far as it goes,"" "too much to bear,"o
"comes up short,"91 and "beg[s] the question."92 The backhanded
criticisms are stinging rejections of Hall Street Associates' make-
weight arguments. The arguments, in fact, test the Court's
patience.
As it dismisses Hall Street Associates' core contentions, the
majority makes its only reference to contract freedom and its role
in the elaboration of U.S. arbitration law.93 The Court concedes
that the statute sustains the application of the following principle:
The FAA lets parties tailor some, even many, features of arbitra-
tion by contract, including the way arbitrators are chosen, what
their qualifications should be, which issues are arbitrable, along
with procedure and choice of substantive law." Nonetheless, in
the Court's view, contract freedom does not overwhelm the statute.
The legislative will provides bedrock answers, supreme and unas-
sailable expressions of the people's will. Statutory law is religion
freed of the empiricism of science; its provisions are final and abso-
lute. In a conflict between contract and law, therefore, the latter
unquestionably prevails.
The Court concludes that FAA §10 and 11 establish an unam-
biguous substantive standard for judicial supervision of arbitral
awards. The standard is intolerant of individual modifications by
contract.95 The judicial vacatur of awards is based on "egregious
departures" 96 and "extreme arbitral conduct";9 7 the statute lists
specific instances of abhorrent arbitrator behavior that invalidate
arbitral awards. Because of the specificity of enumeration, and
given that the FAA provisions do not contain a "textual hook for










REVISITING HALL STREET ASSOCIATES
expansion"98 of their content, the "contracting parties . . . cannot
[be] authorize[d] to supplement review for specific instances of
outrageous conduct with review for just any legal error."99 The
Court adds pointedly that "'[f]raud"o and a mistake of law are not
cut from the same cloth."10
The statute dictates the applicable rule. When the statutory
provisions contain "no hint of flexibility,"10 2 they are not default
legal rules meant to remedy the absence of party provision. The
majority asserts that "fighting the text" 0 3 is not a sensible means of
establishing governing legal rules. The gravamen of FAA §§ 9, 10,
and 11 cannot be mistaken: these sections substantiate "a national
policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to
maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straight-
away."10 4 Studied understatement has evaporated. While the for-
mulations remain 'Souteresque,' the message is embedded in
absolute clarity: the federal judicial policy favoring arbitration is
fully intact and the statutory law and its imperative provisions do
not tolerate private individual alterations. Permitting parties to in-
troduce de novo review into the process by agreement would
"bring arbitration theory to grief in post arbitration process."105
The Court has emphasized the negative character of vacatur
litigation since at least its 1995 ruling in First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan.10 6 In its view, "full-bore legal and evidentiary ap-
peals"10 will erode arbitration's finality, flexibility, and frugality.
Judicialization will transform the remedy into the pathology it en-
deavors to cure. That interpretation was plausible and believable
until the rulings in Rent-A-Center'08 and Stolt-Nielsen.109 The hold-
ings in these cases appeared not only to limit the federal policy
favoring arbitration, but also to modify it by transforming judicial
deference into an overt and unyielding judicial superiority with re-
spect to law application and the protection of legal rights.
98 Id.
99 Id.




104 id. at 588.
105 Id.
106 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
107 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 588.
108 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010).
109 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010).
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VII. THE AmlcI
The majority opinion makes evident that the determinations
were unaffected by amici submissions. Their bluster was inconse-
quential. The issue before the Court was of critical significance to
the law and practice of arbitration and the service industries born
of the favorable federal policy concerning arbitration. Each party
generated its own group of supporters who reasoned that the
Court's failure to adopt the stance they espoused would lead to a
cataclysmic event. The Court relied on its own lights and appeared
intent on discouraging the growth of "interested" participation in
the litigation before it:
We do not know who, if anyone, is right, and so cannot say
whether the exclusivity reading of the statute is more of a threat
to the popularity of arbitrators or to that of courts. But
whatever the consequences of our holding, the statutory text
gives us no business to expand the statutory grounds.110
VIII. MYSTIFYING DICTA
In dicta, the Court tries to temper the effect of its exclusivity
holding by contending that the supervision of arbitral awards is
available outside the framework of the FAA."' In other words,
although the statutory grounds are "exclusive"1 1 2 (otherwise stated,
not modifiable by contract), the parties could obtain "more search-
ing review""13 of awards (i.e., review of the merits) under other
frameworks for judicial supervision. The assertion is mesmerizing.
By way of illustration, the Court explains that parties "may con-
template enforcement under state statutory or common law. . .
where judicial review of different scope is arguable."1 1 4 It is diffi-
cult to divine what Justice Souter means by "arguable" in this state-
ment; the word is another fastidious understatement that makes
understanding difficult. More importantly, the contention does not
110 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 589.
1 Id. at 590.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. On the wording of the Court's statement, see Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., 668 F.3d
655, 655 (9th Cir. 2012), cited and discussed comprehensively in Anthony Rallo, The Veil of
Acquiescence: Between the Lines of an Intuitive Decision.. ., submission to 2 YB. ARB. L. & Doc.
333 (2013).
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seem to account for the impact of the federal preemption doc-
trine.1 5 If a form of review is unacceptable under federal law be-
cause it is overly intrusive, it should be similarly illegal under state
statutory regimes on arbitration. If a state arbitration law would
permit parties to contract out of the statutory basis for judicial su-
pervision of awards, a provision for de novo merits review or for
examining the arbitrator's evidentiary determinations would dan-
gerously compromise arbitral autonomy and could damage the in-
stitution of private adjudication. Undercutting the national policy
on arbitration by enforcing the provisions of a non-conforming
state law is precisely the result that the federal preemption doc-
trine was intended to prevent." 6
State law cannot serve as a parallel regulatory mechanism
under which significant provisions of federal arbitration law can be
avoided or ignored. A state law of arbitration might even tolerate
the contractual elimination of all bases for judicial supervision-a
situation that even more aggressively infringes on the Court's ex-
clusivity holding in Hall Street Associates. The federal doctrine on
arbitration has never been receptive to state-law-based intrusions
upon the autonomy of the arbitral process.1 7 To the extent it fails
to conform to the preemption standard, the observation in dicta
should be seen as an ill-considered remark that confuses even fur-
ther an already convoluted discussion.
The Court's other illustration-its reference (presumably) to
the common law grounds"-fails to acknowledge that common
law grounds have long been part of the FAA framework for the
enforcement of awards. They make possible the judicial review of
115 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 127-28. The federal preemption doctrine protects the
FAA from deviant state laws. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388
U.S. 395 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the FAA was binding on all federal courts
regardless of the basis for their assertion of jurisdiction. In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1 (1984) and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), the Supreme
Court expanded this rule to apply to state courts ruling on state law cases that implicate inter-
state commerce. Finally, in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003), the Supreme
Court endorsed a broad definition of "interstate commerce," effectively mandating that state
courts apply the FAA when ruling on matters pertaining to arbitration. By 2003, the FAA had
become the sole source of law, preempting state laws that deviated from its commands on the
regulation of arbitration. See also Nitro-Lift Tech., LLC v. Howard, 568 U.S. _ (2012, (per
curiam opinion) ("The FAA.. . is 'the supreme Law of the Land. . .' It is this Court's responsibil-
ity to say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to
respect that understanding of the governing rule of law."). Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
1s Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 590.
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the merits of arbitrator determinations.' 19 A more helpful state-
ment would have accounted for the conflict between the common
law grounds and the statutory basis for vacatur, and addressed the
incongruity of prohibiting merits review by contract when the same
approach is available through the common law grounds integrated
into the statute. The majority's characterization of manifest disre-
gard as a metaphor for statutory grounds120 does not account for
the two other common law grounds or explain how manifest disre-
gard differs from de novo review. Because manifest disregard
yields a review of the merits, there is no need to provide for such
review in the contract for arbitration unless the parties seek to in-
clude a more rigorous and specific form of review. The majority's
reference to the common law grounds, therefore, raises a host of
problems that are not even remotely resolved by the Court's retort,
"[b]ut here we speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial
review under §§ 9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possi-
ble avenues for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards."12 1
IX. THE DIssENTs
The dissents focus on the language of the statute and the con-
cept of contract freedom.12 2 Justice Breyer's dissent echoes, to
some extent, his interpretative approach in First Opinions of Chi-
cago, Inc. v. Kaplan;12 3 he concludes that the FAA "does not pre-
clude enforcement of such an agreement." 1 2 4 There is no language
in the statute that provides for statutory exclusivity or that prohib-
its parties from agreeing to a different vacatur regime. Justice Ste-
vens' dissenting opinion125 articulates the core opposition to the
majority opinion. He maintains that the FAA's statutory regime
can readily coexist with the exercise of contract freedom and spe-
cial provisions for judicial supervision agreed to by the parties.12 6
The common law, historically, has given contract freedom a sub-
stantial impact upon the regulation of arbitration 27 and the statute
119 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 58, at 261-73.
120 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 576, 585.
121 See id. at 590.
122 Id.
123 First Option of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
124 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 596.
125 Id. at 592-96.
126 Id. at 592-93, 595.
127 Id.
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easily tolerates "agreements fairly negotiated by the parties." 1 28
"An unnecessary refusal to enforce a perfectly reasonable category
of arbitration agreements defeats the primary purpose of the stat-
ute."1 29 The actual text of the statute "does not compel . . . a read-
ing that is flatly inconsistent with the overriding interest in
effectuating the clearly expressed intent of the contracting par-
ties."1 3 o Contract freedom-the expression of party choice-has
always been, and continues to be, instrumental to the law and prac-
tice of arbitration. The law aims to protect the exercise of that
choice. Artificial limitations, even if introduced to protect the effi-
ciency of the process, will generate confusion and conflict in the
law. Parties can choose to arbitrate on their own terms and judicial
paternalism should not restrain their free exercise of choice.
The Justice Stevens of this dissent is not the Justice Stevens of
the dissent in Mitsubishi' or Vimar Seguros v. Reaseguros,32 or
even the author of the majority opinion in Mastrobuono v. Shear-
son Lehman Hutton, Inc.' 3 In Hall Street Associates, Justice Ste-
vens touts an ideology that is more characteristic of the Fifth
Circuit's rulings on contract freedom in arbitration and the validity
of 'opt-in' agreements.13 4 It suggests that the legislative will ex-
pressed in the statutory framework can coexist with contract free-
dom even when the latter supplements or alters the statutory text.
The parties have a legal right to choose, and the law's core mission
is to protect that right from infringement. Once exercised, the
freedom to choose extends to all the aspects of the chosen process,
including how awards are to be assessed. The parties can pick their
brand of judicial surveillance, including the general decision to
augment or eliminate it. The choice to arbitrate can be fully extra-
judicial or lead to a complete, albeit peculiar, convergence of judi-
cial and arbitral adjudication. The courts need not protect the




130 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 592-93, 595.
131 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
132 Vimar Seguros y. Reaseguros, S.A. v. MA' Sky Reefer, Her Engines, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
133 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
134 See e.g., Gateway Tech., Inc., v. MCI, 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); LaPine Tech. Corp. v.
Kyocera Corp., 130 F. 3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services.,
Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003), Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001).
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X. THE NEw APPRAISAL
Hall Street Associates does not have much, if any, impact upon
international arbitration. The circumstances of LaPine Tech. Corp.
v. Kyocera Corp.13 5 were international and that decision launched
the 'opt-in wave.' The issue, however, was quickly and completely
embedded in the culture of local law. Moreover, the Court merged
the domestic and international aspects of U.S. arbitration law into
a unitary doctrine13 6 in McMahon'37 and Rodriguez de Ouijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.13 s when it removed Mitsubishi' from
its trans-border circumstances and gave its holding a widened berth
in U.S. arbitration doctrine. 140 Hall Street Associates does not im-
plicate either Article V of the New York Arbitration Conventionl41
or its setting-aside procedure.142 It simply interprets FAA §§ 9-11,
provisions that regulate domestic matters on arbitration. To the
extent that it restrains contract freedom in arbitration (allegedly
for the benefit of arbitral efficiency), the holding in Hall Street As-
sociates might prevent international parties from choosing a pro-
cess for judicial supervision, but the opinion does not address that
issue either expressly or implicitly. It may serve as a precedent in
the evolving global law on arbitration, and it clearly alerts foreign
parties to the shifting sands of the American law of arbitration.
From a purely domestic vantage point, Hall Street Associates
may be useful and instructive in its prioritization of enacted law
over contract. In regulatory matters, as elsewhere, clarity is always
a virtue. A hierarchy of principles is necessary to any epistemol-
ogy. The prohibition of parties from treating the statute as a mere
default mechanism has a number of benefits. The institutional
standing and stature of the enacted law is reinforced, and arbitra-
tion is less likely to be subject to the chaos of individual prescrip-
tion. Uneven playing fields will be more leveled. Practical
135 LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
136 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 409-15.
137 Shearson/Am. Express., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
138 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also Granite
Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
139 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477; Granite Rock Co., 130 S. Ct. 2847. See also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
140 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229.
141 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
142 See id. Giving the setting aside provision in Article V of the New York Arbitration Con-
vention special significance is warranted because the setting aside procedure applies on the basis
of domestic law of the requested State. It represents a reference to local law in a trans-border
framework for the enforcement of international arbitral agreements and awards.
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legitimacy is added to the theoretical idea that law and courts have
a significant social function in their service as vehicles for proclaim-
ing and instituting the will of the community in matters of fairness
and justice. The anarchy of contract could make it difficult to
achieve an effective rule of law. Society acquires legal civilization
by tempering individual liberty with the necessary discipline of
constraints. Circumstantial determinations must contribute in
some measure to general guidance-at least, so goes the theory of
social and political organization.
In this sense, Hall Street Associates reintroduces balance and
stability to the U.S. law of arbitration. By emphasizing the impor-
tance of expedited enforcement proceedings, the Hall Street Court
solidifies judicial support for the operation of the arbitration pro-
cess and its outcomes. It thereby-at least, arguably-fosters the
autonomy of the arbitration process. One of the unstated or un-
derstated propositions of the current U.S. law of arbitration, how-
ever, is that the contractual choice to arbitrate has consequences.
Contracting parties not only explicitly bargain for economy, exper-
tise, expedition, and enforceability in adjudication, but they also
subscribe to the existing law and legal policy on arbitration and the
courts' ongoing supervision of the arbitral process on this basis.
Their bargain for arbitration implies acquiescence to the arbitra-
tors and their use of authority and the legal doctrine that governs
arbitration and seeks to keep it fair, functional, and final.
As in Mastrobuono, the parties in Hall Street Associates were
free to choose, but were obligated to choose responsibly. The bar-
gain for arbitration implies a further commitment to uphold the
effectiveness of private adjudication. In Mastrobuono, the parties
could not select state law provisions that would disable their refer-
ence to arbitration unless they did so deliberately and knowingly.
The Court's determination in Mastrobuono was benevolent; it
sought to protect the right to arbitrate from ill-considered refer-
ences to state law. In Hall Street Associates, the parties were told
by the Court that they could not choose to judicialize the final
phase of arbitration by authorizing de novo judicial review because
such a practice would undermine the expedition of court supervi-
sion of awards and, by extension, the speed of the arbitral process
itself. Both cases demonstrate that parties can choose freely as
long as their choices do not lead to an oxymoronic or pathological
reference to arbitration.
The protection proffered in Hall Street Associates, however,
was more ominous than in Mastrobuono-protective benevolence
613
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in Hall Street Associates had been transformed into a less deferen-
tial form of paternalism. By eliminating party provision at this
stage of the process, the Court removed the parties and their arbi-
trators from decision-making on the matter of enforcement. Ac-
cordingly, the ruling in favor of arbitration in Hall Street Associates
was a double-edged sword. The decision privileged expedited en-
forcement but left the Court and its sense of juridical principles as
the all-powerful standard-bearer in the final, conclusive phase of
the process. In Hall Street Associates, the Court concluded that the
parties' amalgamation of trial formats at the enforcement stage
lessened arbitration's functionality and effectiveness. Party provi-
sion, therefore, unacceptably diminished arbitration's remedial ef-
ficacy, contradicted the law and its objectives, and was unlawful.
Having no guide other than its own sense of legality, practical-
ity, and necessity, the Hall Street Court held that only the enacted
law could determine how arbitral rulings were to be evaluated.
The exclusion of contract freedom in enforcement rendered the ar-
bitral process less malleable and adaptive-two characteristics that
have contributed considerably to its social utility and adjudicatory
success. As a result, practical experience and the needs of the par-
ties were less significant to the regulation of arbitration. Through
the Court, the law gave itself absolute jurisdiction to regulate the
confirmation and vacatur of arbitral awards. The judiciary would
decide which principles applied, when they applied, and what they
meant both generally and specifically. The Court became the
grand fiduciary of the public and private interest in arbitral adjudi-
cation. It protected arbitration from wayward arbitrators and idio-
syncratic contract provisions. Parties could not 'opt in1 43 -let
alone 'opt out.' The enforcement process was impervious to con-
tract. The statutory regime was the exclusive protocol for the judi-
cial assessment of an arbitrator's determinations and the trial that
engendered them.14 4
143 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 586. (By declaring FAA §§ 9, 10, and 11 to be the
"exclusive" means or basis for regulating the enforcement of arbitral awards, the Court re-
stricted the use of contract freedom in arbitration.)
144 Parties have a contractual right to choose arbitration and customize their recourse to the
process-in terms of the submission of disputes, the selection of arbitrators, the procedural fea-
tures of the proceedings, and the basis for reaching a determination. Once the arbitrator rules
and gives effect to their bargain, the parties' authority to mold the process ceases. Functus of-
ficio disables both the arbitrators and the parties in terms of the process. The rendition of the
award repositions the arbitral process under the provisions of the enacted law and subjects it to
the judicial construction of the norms for adjudicatory validity. Parties can bargain to forgo
courts and entrust private judges with the resolution of their disputes, but their right to choose
ends when a result is rendered.
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By administering a 'haircut' to contract freedom, the Hall
Street Court reinvigorated the regulatory privilege of the law over
arbitration. Only public institutions could validate private adjudi-
catory determinations. Although parties could assume the risk of
arbitrating in whatever manner they chose, the State would not al-
low them to take the same risk in terms of the final result. The
deal for private adjudication was somehow different at its conclu-
sion than its inception. Despite the failures of judicial litigation,
the requirements of public adjudication became dominant at this
stage of the process. Arbitrators could not be trusted (or empow-
ered by private parties) to reach legally valid determinations on
their own.
The Court's holding did not respond to the issue that opened
the litigation: whether 'opt-in' agreements were enforceable con-
tracts. The Court held more generally that the FAA's enforcement
provisions were "exclusive."145 By voiding all contract stipulations
regarding the enforcement of awards, it established the exclusive
authority of courts to decide the validity of arbitral awards. Only
courts could identify and apply the standards of lawfulness. The
decisional objective in Hall Street Associates was much larger than
what was stated in the petition for certiorari. The purpose was to
establish the controlling authority of actors at different stages of
the arbitral process. The case was an exercise in demarcating
boundaries and allocating territory. With the ruling in Hall Street
Associates, it was clear that the law and the courts had exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the enforcement of awards. Even internal
arbitral appeal,14 6 seemingly, could not alter the statutory regime
and process of enforcement.
"Functus Officio is a Latin term meaning 'having performed his or her office.' With regard
to an officer of an official body, it means without further authority or legal competence because
the duties and functions of the original commission have been fully accomplished.... For exam-
ple, the functus officio doctrine dictates that, once arbitrators have fully exercised their authority
to adjudicate the issues submitted to them, 'their authority over those questions is ended,' and
'the arbitrators have no further authority, absent agreement by the parties, to redetermine
th[ose] issue[s].' [T.Co. Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. Jan.
14, 2010) . . .]" See http://thelawdictionary.org/functus-officio/ (last visited March 13, 2013).
145 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. 586.
146 Internal arbitral appeal involves the review of the initial arbitral award by a second panel
of arbitrators for errors of law, serious procedural flaws, or on any other basis chosen by the
parties. Like arbitration itself, internal arbitral appeal is a product of contract. Parties to an
arbitration agreement may establish a non-judicial appellate process for the award. Internal
arbitral appeal is attractive in that it keeps arbitration private and efficient. Even if courts en-
force the parties' agreement for internal arbitral appeal, they are unlikely to hold that such
procedures foreclose any judicial role in terms of the confirmation and vacatur of awards. See,
e.g., Paul Bennett Marrow, A Practical Approach to Affording Review of Commercial Arbitra-
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In keeping with its principal holding, the Court also attempted
to confine the governing statutory law to its enacted content by
eliminating the so-called common law grounds for vacatur-in par-
ticular, manifest disregard of the law. The majority opinion makes
abundantly clear its position that manifest disregard should cease
having a separate, autonomous function and rather be absorbed
into the existing statutory language and become part of the excess
of authority ground. The consequence would be the enacted statu-
tory text's increased exclusivity. Excising manifest disregard from
vacatur proceedings would eliminate a popular means of engaging
in the judicial review of arbitral awards' merits, thereby strength-
ening the independence of arbitral determinations. By the same
token, incorporating the ground into the express language of the
statute would enhance the circumference and range of the statu-
tory grounds and have them accomplish what had been available
only through the common law grounds. As a result, the singularity
(and growing elasticity) of the statutory regime would be affirmed,
as would the enhanced power of the courts at this stage of the arbi-
tral process.
The holding and dicta, therefore, were all of a piece. Both
determinations empowered the courts to exercise their supervisory
powers over the arbitrators and the arbitral process, and made it
impossible to achieve any contractual exemption from the use of
that power. No insurance was available against the risk of judicial
reversal of arbitral awards. The parties were helpless against the
exercise of judicial authority. They could not protect themselves
against a judicial finding of evident arbitrator partiality (because of
would-be nondisclosure) or the conclusion that the arbitrators ex-
ceeded their authority by agreeing at the outset of the transaction
to forgo those possibilities. The parties had to tolerate uncertainty
in their bargain for arbitration because courts were entitled to ap-
ply the law, and the law was entitled to set standards-no matter
their impact on individual bargains and the bargaining parties' in-
tent. A judicial conviction that adjudicatory power had been mis-
used would thwart an arbitration regardless of the parties' intent to
have awards stand as rendered. An anonymous collective interest
demanded that courts and public regulation have a firm and irrevo-
cable hand in the operation of the arbitral process. The need to
have the judiciary protect arbitration and the law's exclusive man-
tion Awards: Using An Appellate Arbitrator, in AAA HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARarrRA-
TION 485 (Thomas Carbonneau and Jeanette A. Jaeggi eds., 2010).
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date to provide this type of protection are the less evident and
more fundamental contributions of Hall Street Associates.
The insidious character of Hall Street Associates did not be-
come fully evident until the decisions in Rent-A-Center and Stolt-
Nielsen. The latter decisions, especially Stolt-Nielsen, are notorious
for their expansion of the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral
process. Rent-A-Center addressed the governance of the threshold
part of the process, asserting-through the fabrication of a second
separability clause-that the courts had adopted the new mission
of validating the enforceability of a Kaplan jurisdictional delega-
tion clause. While the specific result in Rent-A-Center favored ar-
bitration and arbitrability, the reasoning also attributed a decisive
function to the courts in the initial jurisdictional stage of the pro-
cess, despite the parties' agreement to have the arbitrator decide
all jurisdictional matters. Stolt-Nielsen was an even stronger as-
sault on arbitral autonomy, representing a more vigorous challenge
to the authority of the arbitrating parties and the ruling arbitrators.
There, the parties disagreed about whether their contract permit-
ted or tolerated the submission of disputes to class action arbitra-
tion. They submitted the matter to a specially-designated panel of
AAA arbitrators. The arbitrators held hearings and listened to ex-
pert opinion; they concluded that the parties' arbitral clause did
not prohibit litigating disputes on a class action basis. That deter-
mination caused considerable consternation among a majority of
the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. The majority opinion com-
plained mightily about the arbitrators' construction of the contract,
especially the significance they attached to the silence of the agree-
ment on the issue of class action. Silence was silence; logically,
meaning could not be discovered in a contractual void.
By concluding that the absence of reference implied a pre-
sumptive permissibility, the arbitrators had not construed the con-
tract entered into by the parties, but rather imposed their own
policy choices on them and their agreement. This post facto rewrit-
ing of the terms of the agreement was an egregious departure from
permissible contract construction and constituted an 'excess of au-
thority.' By concluding that the contract was hospitable to class
action arbitration, the arbitrators had reformulated the contract's
terms and made it reflect values that the arbitrators thought the
parties should have possessed had they been prescient at the time
of contract formation.
In many respects, Hall Street Associates presaged both Rent-A-
Center and Stolt-Nielsen. All three opinions address the courts'
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role in the regulation of the arbitral process, allowing courts to
usurp the authority of parties and arbitrators to make conclusive
choices about the manner and extent of arbitrability. Speaking in
the name of governing legal norms, the Court decided what behav-
iors and determinations were permissible in arbitration. Although
the parties bargained for arbitrator rulings, the Court decided what
was lawful in arbitration. Despite the agreement's exclusion of
courts, a judge decided whether a Kaplan jurisdictional delegation
clause was an enforceable contract and courts decided whether an
arbitrator's interpretation of the arbitral clause stood (regardless of
any reference to either Kaplan or Green Tree Financial Corpprora-
tion v. Bazzlel4 7 ). Judicial supervision was no longer deferential
but was instead decisive. It promoted traditional legal values and
positions, not arbitral autonomy and arbitrability. It introduced
fundamental deviations from the prior practice and policy, thereby
redefining both of them.
The federal policy favoring arbitration was no longer so em-
phatic; it could be made to bow to would-be legal imperatives (re-
garding contract construction, validity, and enforceability) no
matter the parties' agreement or how the arbitrators may have de-
cided. It represented a judicial approach that diminished and de-
preciated arbitration and subordinated it to the overwhelming
force of judicial disagreement and disapprobation. It depicted a re-
emergence of judicial hostility to, and competition with, arbitra-
tion. It may well announce a return to the status quo ante, in which
arbitration is seen as renegade adjudicatory relief. To some de-
gree, in these cases, the oracle of contemporary U.S. arbitration
law abandoned its bastard offspring, surrendered its parental rights
and responsibilities, and returned to its former position in the plan-
tation house.
XI. CONCLUSION
The existence of these developments in the decisional law is
incontrovertible. The rulings and their consequences are, in major
part, unmistakable. The cases clearly bear a unifying affinity with
one another that celebrates, in a like-minded fashion, the superior-
ity of legal values over arbitration. It is difficult to argue they are
'one-off' events. These cases could announce a reversal of fortune
147 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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for arbitration and the end of its golden age. Believing that a rela-
tionship of 'cooperative dominance' is in the offing explains noth-
ing and is simply wrong-headed. The law either allows arbitration
to flourish on its own terms or crushes the process with its conven-
tional law agenda. The power to authorize or prohibit resides with
the Court. The current indeterminacy of arbitration's legal stand-
ing is further complicated by the more recent ground-breaking de-
cision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which the Court
upheld unequivocally the autonomous operation of arbitration. In
AT&T Mobility, the Court declared that class action waivers were
a legitimate part of the bargain for the arbitration and that adhe-
sive arbitral clauses were lawful, enforceable contracts. The AT&T
Mobility decision stands in marked contrast to the Court's disposi-
tion in Hall Street Associates, Rent-A-Center, and Stolt-Nielsen.
AT&T Mobility is a judicial pronouncement that embodies cate-
gorical judicial deference to arbitration. Despite their suspect legal
character, the Court validates contract practices vital to
arbitrability.
In terms of arbitration, the Court seems to be of two minds,
delivering contradistinctive messages about the applicable policy.
It has become difficult to proffer guidance on the law of arbitration
in light of the bifurcation in approach. The type or usage of arbi-
tration (commercial or adhesive) does not explain the dichotomy in
doctrine. The struggle appears to reside between the hegemony of
law and the necessity of recourse to arbitration. On the one hand,
the Court does not want to forgo its role as the purveyor of gov-
erning standards or its ability to rectify what it perceives to be dis-
turbing arbitrator error. On the other hand, it does not want to
cripple the arbitral process with ill-suited, misfit acts of legal regu-
lation. At the very least, provided an overarching systemic per-
spective is justified and consistent with the reality of the Court's
deliberations, the Court is undecided about the future direction of
U.S. arbitration law. It is not sure whether to trust the arbitrators,
the parties, and their legal counsel, or to protect society and the
parties themselves from the choice of arbitrating disputes.
Stolt-Nielsen reveals that the Court, despite its protestations to
the contrary, 4 9 wants to jettison manifest disregard from the U.S.
148 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
149 Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l, 130 S. Ct. 1768 n.3 (2010) ("We do not decide whether
'manifest disregard' survives our decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. . . . as
an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur
set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10. AnimalFeeds characterizes that standard as requiring a showing that
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law of arbitration and transfer its previous function into the statu-
tory ground relating to excess of authority. The role of internal
arbitration appeal of awards remains truly undecided, especially as
to its impact upon the grounds for the judicial supervision of
awards. Eliminating the latter could circumvent the judiciary com-
pletely and bestow unfettered authority upon appellate arbitrators.
Such an outcome, however, would void the impact of the holdings
in Hall Street Associates, Rent-A-Center, and Stolt-Nielsen. These
cases appear to signal a desire to return to the public process of
litigation and end the privatization of adjudication. They exem-
plify judicial distrust of the legitimacy of adjudication through arbi-
tration and the Court's lack of confidence in arbitration's
adjudicatory capabilities. If these assessments are confirmed by fu-
ture practice, it will place even greater stress on public resources
and diminish-perhaps imperil-the rights of American citizens.
To argue that such consequences are untenable and unrealistic
makes it difficult to explain the result and reasoning in the 'new
trilogy' of anti-arbitration cases.15 0 The best defense to alleged ju-
dicial distrust of arbitration is to argue that the outcomes in the
cases are stand-alone events that result from the justices' internal
discussion of the legal issues that pertain to individual cases or re-
flect the eventual congealing of contradistinctive opinions within
the Court. In this sense, the three cases are akin to Volt Informa-
tion Sciences,'15 an aberrant decision, the non-conforming doctrinal
aspects of which were gradually buried in decisional oblivion.
Nonetheless, the rulings introduce a sliver of distrust in the wall of
arbitration doctrine. The possible breach in the edifice of law is
ominous and portends an undecided future and an unresolved
destiny for arbitral adjudication. Let's hope that judicial distrust,
hostility, and envy are figments of an intemperate legal
imagination.
the arbitrators "knew of the relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled
the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refus-
ing to apply it." Brief for Respondent 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). Assuming, argu-
endo, that such a standard applies, we find it satisfied for the reasons that follow.").
150 In the forty-five or so cases on arbitration decided by the Court, there isa not insignificant
handful that ruled against arbitration and refused to promote the autonomy of the process.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) was the first such decision, followed a decade later by Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Also part of this group are: Volt Information
Sciences (note 152 infra), EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002), and the three princi-
pal cases discussed in the text.
151 Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. Trs. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
